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Underground waterlines
Explaining political quiescence of Ukrainian labor unions
Denys Gorbach
Abstract: In order to explore factors conditioning the political quietude of 
Ukrainian labor, this article analyzes ethnographic data collected at two large en-
terprises: the Kyiv Metro and the privatized electricity supplier Kyivenergo. Focus-
ing on a recent labor confl ict, I unpack various contexts condensed in it. I analyze 
the hegemonic confi guration developed in the early 1990s, at the workplace and 
at the macro level, and follow its later erosion. Th is confi guration has been based 
on labor hoarding, distribution of nonwage resources, and patronage networks, 
featuring the foreman as the nodal fi gure. On the macro scale, it relied on the me-
diation by unions, supported by resources accumulated during the Soviet era and 
the economic boom of the 2000s. Th e depletion of these resources has spelled the 
ongoing crisis of this confi guration.
Keywords: accumulation regimes, labor militancy, labor unions, post-socialism, 
Ukraine, workplace hegemony
Th e largest mobilization event in Ukraine’s mod-
ern history, the 2013–2014 Maidan protests, 
which led to the ousting of President Viktor Ya-
nukovych, started as a preparation for a general 
strike. However, the strike never happened, and 
the labor agenda was quickly sidelined, despite 
economic grievances being the background of 
the protests, and a million-strong trade union, 
the Confederation of Free Trade Unions of 
Ukraine (KVPU), formally participating in 
them. Its competitor, the Federation of Trade 
Unions of Ukraine (FPU), boasting more than 
eight million members, has traditionally been 
even more cautious, despite possessing massive 
organizational resources and oft en-favorable 
structure of political opportunity.
Why does the unions’ passivist attitude allow 
non-class-based agendas to monopolize polit-
ical discourse? In order to uncover the puzzle 
of the political quietude of Ukraine’s organized 
labor, one must examine the historical conjunc-
ture that conditions and frames it, as well as the 
critical junctions ensuring dynamic interaction 
between the shop fl oor, the enterprise, and the 
state. Th e key to understanding labor’s passivity 
in Ukraine—and likely other post-Soviet coun-
tries—lies in the peculiar development of he-
gemonic relations on these three levels. On the 
shop fl oor, the legitimate voice of the workers is 
the foreman rather than the formal union rep-
resentative. On the enterprise level, the union 
is just an auxiliary wing of the management, 
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having little real connection to the upper layers 
of union bureaucracy. Th e latter is an important 
element of the national corporatist hegemonic 
pact ensuring social peace, but it cannot really 
pull out and initiate serious political mobiliza-
tion. On all these levels, patronage networks 
prevail over the logic of mass mobilization.
Th ese relations can be interpreted as hege-
monic not only because they are built on a set of 
shared “common sense” values and norms but 
also because these principles and standards of 
behavior are imposed by a “historical bloc” of 
dominant and dominated social collective ac-
tors. In this article, I argue that this historical 
bloc is currently being dismantled on all levels 
in the course of a general conjunctural crisis, 
which began about a decade ago. Th e coming 
conjuncture seems to rely on a greater bureau-
cratic control on the shop fl oor, the elimination 
of the union at the enterprise level, and the 
prevalence of clientelist populist politics over 
bureaucratic inertia on the macro scale. First, I 
will give a brief literature overview and present 
my theoretical frameworks and fi eld sites. Th en, 
I will trace the dynamics of the post-Soviet 
Ukrainian peak-level hegemonic pact. Next, I 
will tell the story of an industrial confl ict and 
describe the grounded realities of sustaining 
hegemony at the post-Soviet workplace. Finally, 
I will discuss some new trends observed in the 
fi eld. Th ese fi ndings will be summed up and put 
into a wider context in the conclusion.
Reacting to the debate on Taylorist labor 
deskilling (Braverman [1974] 1998), Michael 
Burawoy (1979) off ered less linear and determin-
ist optics by “taking Gramsci to the workplace” 
and conceptualizing “hegemonic” versus “des-
potic” factory regimes. Th is article seeks to build 
on this general approach to the analysis of “rela-
tions in and of production.” It was also Burawoy 
who gave a thorough treatment to post-socialist 
power relations and conventions (Burawoy and 
Krotov 1993; Burawoy et al. 2000). He and Kath-
erine Verdery (1999) set up the stage for anthro-
pology of labor in Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), a fi eld laden with confl icting approaches. 
Th us, Verdery’s (1996) institutionalist approach 
to political economy of (post-)socialism rhymes 
well with the work of Hillel Ticktin (1992) on 
Stalinist social contract at and beyond the work-
place, viewing it as a product of the contradic-
tions of Soviet political economy, characterized 
by chronic shortage, lack of profi t drive, and 
prevalence of covert “perverted class struggle” 
(S. Clarke 1993a; Filtzer 1992). Th is approach 
can be discussed with “corporatist” interpreta-
tions of CEE “labor weakness” (Crowley 1997, 
2004; Ost 2000) and political institutions (Kubi-
cek 2004; Way 2015), which oft en employ his-
torical institutionalist optics.
However, the neo-institutionalist tendency 
toward compartmentalization and static macro 
analysis should be balanced by “political econ-
omy of personhood” (Kalb 2014) and critical 
junctions approach, inspired by Gramscian 
categories of class and hegemony (Kalb and 
Tak 2006). Don Kalb (2002) uses these optics 
to make an important point about diverging 
strategies of neoliberal labor shedding in the 
Eastern EU and continuing labor hoarding in 
the former USSR. Both areas have been tradi-
tionally associated with “labor weakness,” but 
the latest literature on Eastern EU questions 
this diagnosis.
Adam Mrozowicki (2014) shows how skilled 
workers of the automotive sector across the 
region managed to overcome the oft en-cited 
structural diffi  culties and build impressive or-
ganizing capacity. In the Polish case, union re-
vitalization began in late 2000s, signifying the 
end of the “transition”-era weakness (Bernaciak 
and Lis 2017). Similar dynamics are observed 
among Romanian autoworkers (Adăscăliței and 
Guga 2017). Th is revival is associated with the 
advent and stabilization of “real capitalism,” 
which is yet to happen in post-Soviet countries 
like Ukraine and Russia, where workers are de-
mobilized, but also partially protected, by qua-
si-corporatist social pacts (Ashwin and Clarke 
2003; Mandel 2004; Varga 2014). Th is work will 
contribute to a better understanding of the cur-
rent dynamics in this second realm.
To conceptualize these dynamics, I will sum-
mon yet another part of Gramscian theoretical 
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legacy, namely conjunctural analysis (J. Clarke 
2014), which allows me to interpret hegemonic 
confi gurations observed at diff erent levels as 
parts of one conjuncture and to historicize the 
latter, shedding light on its current crisis and 
sketching the contours of the conjuncture to 
come. My ethnographic data were collected 
during a round of fi eldwork conducted in Kyiv, 
Ukraine, from January to March 2017. I con-
ducted 24 semi-structured and unstructured 
in-depth interviews with workers and union 
activists of two large companies: the Kyiv Metro 
and the privatized energy supplier Kyivenergo. 
Th ese fi eld sites were chosen for their big size 
and structural position, which would allow hy-
pothetical strikers there to control important 
infrastructural bottlenecks in Kyiv, thus infl u-
encing wider sociopolitical agenda. Metro is a 
municipal enterprise, while Kyivenergo was pri-
vatized several years ago; this diff erence could 
help clarify the role of ownership structure in 
the development of a factory regime and work-
ers’ militancy. I also interviewed regional and 
national leaders, as well as clerical employees, of 
unions and employer groups.
Th e making of post-Soviet unions
Th e basic institutions relevant to our topic were 
spawned by the Stalinist productivity drives 
aimed at raising the rate of exploitation. Th ese 
eff orts were sabotaged by the informal coalition 
of factory directors and workers. Th e primary 
interest of the former lay in fulfi lling the plan, 
which required hoarding resources (including 
workforce)—maximizing offi  cially required in-
puts and minimizing negotiated output bench-
marks—but also ensuring collaboration on the 
part of the workers. Taylorist methods of pro-
duction were never completely introduced at 
Soviet factories, and skilled workers maintained 
autonomous “negative” control over produc-
tion process. To prevent sabotage, management 
had to make signifi cant informal concessions to 
workers, in return expecting extra eff orts under 
pressing circumstances. Th is “plan-fulfi llment 
pact” tied the foreman’s legitimacy to his readi-
ness to disregard offi  cial rules. Conversely, line 
managers covered up workers who break formal 
rules but penalized those who transgress infor-
mal norms. Th e two sides have built relations 
where mutual trust and informal conventions 
were more important than offi  cial norms. 
Trade unions, preoccupied with legal rules, 
were an alien element in this confi guration. 
Th ey provided legal advice and protection to 
individual workers and became responsible for 
distributing material goods and social services 
among workers. As part of the “bosses” team, 
they commanded very little trust from workers. 
Th e Soviet hegemonic factory regime, then, was 
the product of the “historical bloc” between the 
management and the (skilled male) workforce, 
where the former shaped its own hegemonic 
agenda by incorporating into it the interests of 
the latter. Th e workers believe the bosses, who 
represent them up above, deliver as much as is 
objectively possible, but they will not tolerate a 
deterioration of their living standards. Th e class 
confl ict was thus displaced onto an upper level, 
reshaped as a dispute between bureaucracy fac-
tions over the distribution of resources via net-
works of patronage and dependence. Impor-
tantly, the factory director came to personify 
the ideological fi ction of the “labor collective,” 
using it as his own political leverage.
In post-Soviet Ukraine, this conjuncture was 
renegotiated in 1993, when coal miners went 
on strike. Th e movement was headed by the di-
rector of a leading mine, who negotiated on the 
workers’ behalf with the government and then 
joined it as the fi rst vice prime minister (Bori sov 
and Clarke 1994). Th is strike was the formative 
event establishing the historical bloc between 
industrial bureaucracy (“red directors”) and the 
industrial working class, embodied in the fi gure 
of the director-cum-president Leonid Kuchma 
(Kubicek 2000). Its hegemonic ideology was 
built around the double quest to avoid a “social 
explosion” in the course of the transition and 
protect the economy from foreign competitors 
(Bojcun 2015; cf. “Czech capitalism” in Myant 
2007).
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Meanwhile, in Russia, 1993 marked a tran-
sition to a new, neoliberal conjuncture: there, 
the “red directors” were defeated by the liberal 
elite faction centered on President Boris Yeltsin. 
Th e Russian successor union body had bet on 
the wrong horse and was politically sidelined in 
the following years (Mandel 2004). It was even-
tually integrated in the new power bloc under 
Putin. In countries like Hungary, Czechoslova-
kia, and Poland, successor unions were stripped 
of the bulk of their property and suff ered severe 
losses in membership because of compulsory 
reregistration campaigns. In Ukraine, the lo-
cal successor union, the FPU was part of the 
emerging historical bloc from the very begin-
ning: President Leonid Kravchuk successfully 
insisted on making his former adviser the head 
of the new structure in 1992. Th e FPU consis-
tently discouraged strike action in the name of 
social stability and maintained its privileged 
position in the scheme of distribution of social 
insurance funds (Davis 2001).
Th e issue of the FPU’s property was left 
unsolved, its ownership rights becoming con-
ditional on the good will of the government. 
Th is makes the FPU’s positions fragile today, 
since membership fees constitute only half its 
budget, the other half being income from the 
vast real-estate institutional legacy. Th us, while 
primary unions do not depend on the central 
bureaucracy in any way besides access to union 
spas and resorts, the latter can be granted only 
as long as the central bureaucracy cooperates 
with the state. In exchange for this dependency, 
the FPU gets a say in the “social dialogue.” Its 
head takes part in government sessions and can 
block draft  legislation. Th e FPU can eff ectively 
infl uence policies in institutions of education, 
health care, and other sectors where wages are 
annually defi ned in the state budget. Th ey also 
have a say in determining wages and labor con-
ditions at fully or partly state-owned companies, 
since their fi nancial plans require government 
approval. Neither fi eld requires any grassroot 
activities on the FPU’s part.
Just as in Russia, “social partnership” here is 
part of something bigger, namely “a social con-
tract not between trade unions and employers, 
but between the government and the people, 
with the trade unions serving as the govern-
ment-anointed representatives of the people” 
(Ashwin and Clarke 2003: 177). In other words, 
the FPU’s legitimacy lays not so much in the 
defense of labor’s interests as in the represen-
tation of “the people” on the symbolic plane, 
important for the integrity of the post-Soviet 
hegemonic confi guration. Meanwhile, at private 
enterprises, everything depends on the local 
union and its relations with the owner. Upper 
levels of union bureaucracy feel unwelcome and 
somehow illegitimate, even if the local union 
is their member organization Th e FPU’s lack 
of militancy is proverbial. Its website features 
news about folk choir competitions under the 
category “Our Struggle” (see Figure 1). “If you 
keep fi ghting with your wife, eventually you will 
divorce. But if you agree on some things—labor 
division, family budget allocation—you will 
live together until old age,” explains Oksana,1 
an FPU clerk. Despite this obvious preference 
for peaceful lobbying, all the FPU functionar-
ies were off ended to hear “political quietude” 
applied to them: people’s defenders should be 
radical.
Th e KVPU, the second largest union federa-
tion, has built its image on perceived radicalism. 
In practice, its strategy is based on skillful use 
of patronage networks rather than mobilizing 
for open confl icts. From 2002 to 2012, KVPU 
Chairman Mykhailo Volynets was an MP on 
an opposition party’s list. Today, he is widely 
believed to have developed clientelist relations 
with the oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. In 2016, 
the KVPU offi  cially built an alliance with the 
neo-Nazi regiment Azov, co-opting one of its 
fi ghters as the deputy head of the federation 
(Cherno morskaya Teleradiokompaniya 2016). 
In a system that hinges on the leader’s personal 
leverage, much attention is paid to accumulat-
ing social and media capital. Volynets talks a 
lot about his connections with the International 
Labor Organization and about his own media 
appearances—topics completely irrelevant to 
the FPU informants. Volynets frankly acknowl-
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edges that the KVPU is not built like union fed-
erations in other countries, where leadership 
changes regularly. He says his retirement will 
mean the end of the whole organization.
Th e FPU works diff erently on the inside, but 
lately it has been looking for an outside patron. 
In 2016, this normally apolitical organization 
established close relations with a second-tier 
populist politician, Serhiy Kaplin, whose “Party 
of Simple People” has been rebranded as Social 
Democratic. Th e FPU made him the unions’ rep-
resentative in the parliament and organizes May 
Day rallies under his leadership. Th e failure of 
the FPU’s traditional legitimation mechanisms 
indicates the wider crisis of the hegemonic con-
juncture in which they worked.
Metro and beyond: 
Hegemony on a micro level
Th e following ethnographic account of a small-
scale workplace confl ict illuminates the factory 
regime at a large Ukrainian enterprise. On a 
Sunday aft ernoon, Yegor, a married father of 
two in his thirties and a section foreman in one 
of the Kyiv Metro’s services, received a phone 
call from a sick worker who could not go on 
the night shift . Yegor called another worker and 
asked him to cover this shift . Later, it transpired 
that the hospital had issued the sick worker’s 
medical leave starting on Monday, not covering 
the four Sunday hours. Yegor’s boss told him to 
mark that worker as absent during these hours, 
but Yegor felt it would be unjust. He decided to 
change the work schedule retroactively, which 
is a common, if not exactly legal, departmental 
practice. Th is time, however, Yegor’s boss em-
phatically refused to sign the edited schedule, 
citing the laws. Chyvokunya, the head of the 
service, ordered Yegor, facing insubordination, 
to write a voluntary request for demotion from 
the foreman’s position, which also he refused to 
do. In the next weeks, his team was showered 
with various checkups and inspections, which 
stripped Yegor of two monthly bonuses and a 
service record for one month.
Yegor found he commanded grassroots sup-
port, but “the bosses” were united against him. 
He was elected the new leader of the union cell, 
and its former leader, Oleg, helped him write 
an offi  cial request to reconsider the reprimand. 
Workers from Yegor’s team also wrote a collec-
tive plea in his defense. Th ese eff orts did not 
Figure : “Our Struggle”: screenshot from the FPU’s website (© Denys Gorbach)
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help: a top-level meeting reaffi  rmed the pun-
ishment, while a new inspection resulted in an-
other reprimand for Yegor and bonus cuts for 
the plea signatories. Oleg helped Yegor write a 
well-grounded request to summon the Labor 
Disputes Commission (KTS). Th is was unprec-
edented: Yegor’s case opened the commission’s 
journal. Normally, nobody questions repri-
mands. Luckily for him, the KTS had to also in-
vite the head of the smaller independent union, 
whom Yegor described as “a big loud man to 
whom everybody listens.” Aft er the case was 
described, he asked: “So what? What did he do 
wrong?” Th e reprimand was canceled, but the 
blame was put on a “technical mistake” of the 
records offi  ce rather than on the maliciousness 
of the service head. Th is decision was not the 
end of the story. Yegor’s immediate boss said 
Chyvokunya insisted on further punishments, 
and asked him to leave the foreman position 
voluntarily. Th is time, Yegor agreed to the “po-
litely formulated request from a reasonable 
person.” He also let his wife and coworkers talk 
him out of continuing the struggle for personal 
justice.
Shall I rob my mother? 
Hegemonic informality
According to Igor, a young worker and Yegor’s 
loyal team member, the confl ict began earlier, 
when Chyvokunya was not elected as the team’s 
delegate to the general union conference. Th e 
event, which should have confi rmed his legit-
imacy as the recently appointed service head, 
actually undermined it in front of the workers 
and bosses. Chyvokunya blamed it on Yegor, 
promising to “calm him down.” Igor explained 
what really went wrong: “Once, before that, 
we had a meeting of our local union cell, and 
Chyvokunya, being the service head, did not 
even show up. Th is is disrespect!” Th e workers 
felt the new manager owed them some respect 
and attention beyond what is prescribed offi  -
cially. When they did not get it, they deprived 
him of their (also informal) trust, symbolically 
denying his legitimacy. Unlike Chyvokunya, 
Yegor was an undoubtedly legitimate boss in his 
workers’ eyes. As a foreman, he felt a personal 
responsibility for the dozen people he oversaw. 
When a worker makes a mistake, the foreman 
must cover it up in front of the bosses. Th e cost 
of refusing to play by these rules is lack of trust 
and cooperation; conversely, “team-oriented” 
behavior pays back in the workers’ commitment.
Th is is a universal expectation. According to 
Maria, a Kyivenergo employee:
A former boss used to scold his subordi-
nates publicly in front of the administra-
tion; I think this was not a right thing to 
do. Another boss screamed at the manag-
ers that his workers cannot ever be wrong, 
but later he privately came up to the 
worker and reprimanded him informally. 
I consider this the golden rule of a leader: 
to solve everything inside the collective.
Maria arrived in Kyiv from Russia to work as a 
geologist in the late 1970s; she raised a son on 
her own, sharing a studio with him in a working-
class suburb. She has been working at Kyiven-
ergo since the early 2000s, despite passing her 
retirement age. She gave her interview on her 
only day off , voluntarily working late evenings 
and Saturdays with no overtime compensation. 
Her department at the head offi  ce consists of 
seven women, including the boss. Currently, 
two are seriously ill; earlier, the boss had vol-
unteered to take a slightly larger amount of 
work for the department, so now fi ve people 
must do the job of eight. According to Maria, 
everyone considers this “normal,” perceiving it 
as mutual help in the tightly knit collective of 
friends rather than surrendering free time and 
energy to an employer without compensation: 
“We don’t have this when you’re done with your 
work and don’t care for the rest. We don’t actu-
ally have the concept of ‘your work.’” For her, 
this is not a doom but a blessing: “Despite all 
the hardships, I really want to go to work every 
morning precisely because of the collective.”
Yegor admits that the system of informal re-
quests and obligations, spanning the workplace 
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beneath the visible offi  cial regulations, is what 
makes the whole mechanism function:
My daughter was born sooner than ex-
pected, so I asked to shift  my vacation, 
and they said no problem. When someone 
fucks up their work, he can ask me, I will 
cover him up and say, “You owe me a co-
gnac.” From the legal point of view, these 
relations are not perfect, but they ensure 
good atmosphere—something Americans 
call team building.
Th e function of these informal ties and commit-
ments gets even clearer in the following story. 
Andreich, a retired foreman of a rail track main-
tenance team, remembers that in the 1980s they 
regularly marked off  old wooden railway sleep-
ers, and employees were allowed to take them 
for their personal needs. Th e Metro’s chief ac-
countant once approached him and asked for 60 
sleepers for her summerhouse construction site:
Obviously, she wanted brand new ones, 
and I arranged it for her. She was very 
grateful, brought me a bottle of cognac. 
Th e story repeated later with someone else 
from the bosses. Th e service head eventu-
ally noticed this, summoned me, and de-
manded explanations. I told him: “Don’t 
you see? I am not giving the sleepers to 
some random fi tter; it’s all between us!”
Six months later, Andreich himself needed 90 
sleepers to build a summerhouse for his par-
ents. He loaded brand-new sleepers into an 
empty truck, but the service head (“a fi rst-class 
thief himself,” according to Andreich) saw and 
started yelling at him. Andreich yelled back: 
“I’m giving good sleepers to the chief accoun-
tant and to everyone else, but I have to send crap 
to my own mother?!” Th e confl ict was resolved 
in his favor.
Informal relations thus not only help ensure 
the smoothness of the production process but 
also help construct hierarchies and exclusions. 
Andreich was accommodating his bosses to 
reap the privileges he had created for them in 
the fi rst place. He also regularly used his infor-
mal leverage to lobby in favor of his workers, 
which was always more effi  cient than an explicit 
collective campaign. Yegor’s confl icting atti-
tude, on the other hand, fell out of tune. Yegor’s 
story exemplifi es the heterogeneity of the work-
force. He was helped by the leader of the free 
union—a smaller “independent” organization 
of the KVPU whose membership consists of 
train drivers. Constituting around 10 percent of 
the Metro’s workforce, they are widely consid-
ered its elite section: their wages are the high-
est, and their independent union is tolerated. 
Th ose staying in the “offi  cial” union also benefi t 
from their unique structural force, being the 
main driver behind every grassroots initiative: 
According to Luda, a station manager, “If they 
don’t drive, we might as well not work at all.”
Unsurprisingly, the feminized workforce 
performing “auxiliary” tasks is much less priv-
ileged, oft en organized around Taylorist princi-
ples. Employees of D services (station operators, 
cleaners, station managers), and K (cashiers) are 
almost always women, the most numerous, the 
least paid, and the most heavily controlled. Th e 
smallest mistake in keeping the station log or 
an insignifi cant breach of protocol (e.g., failing 
to spend 10 minutes between train arrivals on 
the platform in freezing temperatures) is pun-
ishable by fi nes and reprimands. By Yegor’s esti-
mate, the density of informal relations is about 
10 times lower among “the girls” than among 
his colleagues. Employees of D services must 
undergo regular checkups in their free time; 
to get there in time, the young station operator 
Vera must leave home at 6:30 a.m. She returns 
home around 1 p.m. and leaves again at 6 p.m. 
for her night shift . Yegor conceptualizes the dif-
ference in terms of gender stereotypes: “If the 
distance head asked us to come on a holiday, 
many people would simply say no. But women 
have [a] diff erent way of thinking; they are more 
loyal. Th eir main tool is resignation: If you bug-
ger me too much, I will quit.”
Mid-hierarchy employees have other strat-
egies. Most live in villages and suburbs, bene-
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fi ting from lower living costs. Th ey oft en own 
small land plots and have other sources of in-
come like moonlighting: according to Vera’s 
husband, Vova, a signaling engineer, every third 
male employee under 40 also works elsewhere:
Th ey do all kinds of stuff : someone assists 
instructors in a business school, help-
ing them prepare for lectures; someone 
draws low amperage circuits at a design 
institute; someone works as electrician at 
a library; two people build furniture; two 
people are soft ware engineers; another 
one is an electrician at a gas station; yet 
another one is a wireman at a factory. 
Someone works as an inspector at a chain 
of hardware stores. A male station opera-
tor goes to a warehouse and packs boxes 
aft er a night shift  in the Metro. One guy 
had to become a part-time electrician in 
a kindergarten just to be able to send his 
kid there.
Th eir schedule allows for extra work, but it’s not 
an option for “the girls”: they must choose be-
tween loyalty and exit. Th e strategy of the less 
Taylorized male workforce is situated between 
loyalty and voice, relying on the hegemonic 
factory regime’s undercover negotiations and 
unspoken agreements. Just as in the classic ex-
amples, such regime “manufactures consent” 
among key factions of the workforce, prevent-
ing outbursts of protest. In the post-Soviet case, 
it rests on the hegemonic informality and le-
gitimacy norms shared by the workers and the 
management, without any signifi cant role of the 
union.
Crammed tram: Welfare distribution
Th e union, on the other hand, plays an im-
portant role at the enterprise level. Here, it is a 
powerful fi x helping maintain apparent loyalty. 
Distribution of welfare goods and services is 
the union’s primary task for Yegor, Oleg, and 
every other informant. Luda, who spent all her 
life working for the Metro, praises the union 
highly because it gave her the chance to travel 
and send her son to the seaside and even abroad 
to Bulgaria and Hungary. Employees in less 
prominent positions complain they are side-
lined: only bosses can actually go to Hungary. 
Th e least privileged criticize the union because 
they receive no material benefi ts from their 
membership. Ultimately, the union is evaluated 
according to its welfare distribution capacities. 
Its second most important function is to satisfy 
requests related to the organization of work: 
installing water boilers, buying better overalls, 
designating a smoking area. Hardly anyone as-
sociates the union with the struggle for collec-
tive workers’ interests.
Th is perception is so strong that the free 
union, facing mounting demands from mem-
bers, had to reluctantly start providing social 
services as well. Just as with successor unions, 
these activities leave no political space for mili-
tancy. During my fi eldwork, about one hundred 
train drivers participated in a pressure group 
demanding a wage raise. Yet, the free union 
shirked the initiative, fearing the administration 
would sue and take away its spa resort. A union 
leader should avoid open confl icts but be a cun-
ning master of intrigue. Vasiliy, the union offi  -
cial at Kyivenergo, explains his usual strategy: 
“Whenever I notice unrest brewing, I approach 
the management saying: ‘We are about to receive 
a collective statement signed by two hundred to 
four hundred people; what are we going to do? 
My task is to make the general director come 
to the people and give a personal promise. Th e 
5-10-15 percent raise will not save anyone, but 
what is important is the process itself.” Once, 
the general director could not promise anything 
and told Vasiliy to come up with something. He 
went up and announced that wages will be raised 
on 1 April. When asked, “What if they will not?” 
he said, “Th en I quit the job on 1 April.” Th is 
was met with applause, but the general director 
was shocked. Upon establishing that Vasiliy was 
not bluffi  ng, he did his utmost to raise wages. 
Yegor uses similar Machiavellian tactics.
Th ese tactics work well in “Polanyian” in-
dustrial culture. According to a recent survey, 
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guarantee of employment is by far the most im-
portant value for the Ukrainian working class. 
Th e fear of being fi red or transferred to part-
time employment is a more powerful driver 
than desire for better working conditions or 
higher wages  (Petrushina 2016: 70–72). Th e 
two most contentious issues mobilizing workers 
in Ukraine—wage arrears and factory closures 
 (Dutchak 2016: 95)—are defensive: workers are 
trying to protect the existing social contract 
rather than renegotiate it in their own favor. Th e 
union acts as a safety stop, preventing manage-
ment from making steps that will be perceived 
as an attack on the hegemonic social contract. 
When the new Kyiv mayor appointed his fellow 
banker to head the Metro in the late 2000s, he 
tried to cut annual vacation from 31 to 24 days, 
the legal minimum. Th e union, normally quite 
complacent, did not allow this to happen. At 
Kyivenergo, despite the privatization, the length 
of Maria’s vacation is 32 days. Th e union there 
organizes cheap tours and provides presents 
for kids, tickets to concerts, material aid to sick 
workers, cheap loans.
Guarantee of continuing employment is 
also a part of this hegemonic set of claims. 
Maria says: “Kyivenergo has always been like 
a crammed tram: it is hard to get into it, but 
once you’re in, it’s impossible to get out.” In the 
Metro, rumors abound of the coming automa-
tion of cash desks. Yet, most of my informants 
do not think of it as a threat to cashiers’ employ-
ment: they will gradually drop out naturally be-
cause of high turnover, and the most loyal will 
be off ered other positions. Th e same happened 
before, when the management outsourced 
cleaning at some stations to a private company: 
no cleaners were fi red; they were all transferred 
to other stations. Th e hegemonic social con-
tract at such enterprises thus acknowledged 
workers’ rights to jobs and nonwage benefi ts. 
In exchange for that, workers have been ex-
pected to abstain from disrupting social peace 
and production process and implicitly solidar-
ize with the management. Th e union mediates 
these relations, acting as their guarantor. Th is 
peculiar enterprise-level pact directly correlates 
with the “survivalist” conservative hegemonic 
macro confi guration struck in the 1990s. How-
ever, things do change.
Floating along the waterline: New trends
Trying to explain the dynamic equilibrium of 
workplace hegemony in the Metro, Vova used 
a metaphor from high school physics: “Accord-
ing to Archimedes’ principle, the buoyant force 
pushes an object upward, and the gravitational 
force pushes it downward. Th ey interact con-
stantly, and so we are fl oating along the water-
line, on the same level.” But the level of pressure 
from either direction is not a fi xed value, and 
the system is not isolated from all kinds of ex-
ternal factors. What are the challenges to the 
hegemonic equilibrium?
Th e netherworld
Andreich’s career is a good personal scale to 
which we can relate the evolution of the So-
viet and post-Soviet workplace hegemony in 
Ukraine. A 22-year-old alumnus of a vocational 
college for railway workers in Moscow, he ar-
rived in Kyiv in 1977, when Brezhnev’s social 
contract was in its prime, to fi nd and marry 
the girl he had met on vacation, and spent next 
three decades working in the railway mainte-
nance service of the Kyiv Metro. During these 
decades, he became an organic part of the 
post-Stalinist workplace hegemony, masterfully 
using the tools it gave him for personal survival 
and ensuring the optimal effi  ciency of the work 
process. In the 1990s, at the nadir of economic 
crisis, he had to leave the job and take tempo-
rary work at a construction site in Moscow. But 
later he returned and continued working until 
he was 55. As an underground worker on night 
shift s, he had the right to retire at this age, but 
also the opportunity to continue working, re-
ceiving both wage and pension at the same time. 
His bosses begged him to stay, but he resolutely 
refused, making his birthday the last day at 
work. What conditioned his choice?
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According to Andreich and his friend Ira, 
working conditions started changing drastically 
in late 2000s—right before Andreich reached 
his retirement age. Th e main diff erence, they 
describe, lies precisely in the level of autonomy 
of the production process and “negative con-
trol.” Starting in 2009 to 2010, workers have 
had to deal with an increasing burden of for-
mal responsibility for every small aspect of the 
work process; they are required to sign papers 
for every little thing. Modern equipment, cou-
pled with bureaucratic mechanisms of control, 
raised the effi  ciency of disciplinary functions 
to unseen levels. Th ese measures are contested 
in the Metro, but they go relatively unchecked 
within private companies. A recent survey 
 (Dutchak and Gladun 2017) shows no cases of 
full automation of production process; contrary 
to popular beliefs, workers are not afraid of ro-
bot-induced redundancy. Automation of con-
trol is a much more powerful and feared trend: 
CCTVs, turnstiles, e-cards, breathalyzers, and 
fi ngerprint scanners cost less than investing in 
production-related innovations. Th e authors of 
the survey noted a growing unarticulated con-
fl ict over this new machinery.
In the Metro, the multiplicity of oft en-con-
tradictory instructions introduces another 
mode of informal control. “Th e fi rst question 
always goes, which of the rules were you fol-
lowing? No, you had to use the other one,” 
says Sasha, Vera’s colleague. Vova adds to this: 
“Sometimes, you see that something doesn’t 
work right, you repair it, but then you are rep-
rimanded because you did not act according to 
the instructions.” Yegor’s story, aft er all, is also 
about bureaucratic control encroaching on the 
traditional informal hegemonic confi guration. 
In several workspaces in the Metro, I have come 
across a drawing of a man sitting and happily 
watching a bonfi re made of various reprimands, 
fi nes, bills, and summons (see Figure 2). Yegor 
fi rst brought it in, and his colleagues liked it so 
much, they copied it for themselves.
Understaffi  ng is a powerful factor behind 
the new pressures. Station operators are entitled 
to two days off  annually for medical screening, 
but Vera must take unpaid leave: her boss sim-
ply does not countersign her requests because 
there are not enough workers to substitute her. 
Luda, the station manager, canceled her talk 
with me because she had to shovel snow around 
the station by herself that day. Th is is not her 
task formally, but she has only one cleaner at her 
disposal, and she is personally responsible for 
ensuring the station’s smooth functioning with 
the resources available. Management does not 
seem to care about staff  shortage or other ob-
jective obstacles: “If we don’t have enough peo-
ple for four shift s, then we’ll work three shift s.” 
In the 1990s, this was hardly imaginable. Th is 
approach revives the Stalinist quest for “hidden 
productivity reserves” in a new environment of 
underinvestment and austerity. In the railway 
maintenance service, workers must confi rm the 
acceptance of materials by their signature. Th e 
actual materials may be of a lower quality or 
quantity than is written in the documents, but 
they have no choice but to take responsibility as 
if everything is in order. Andreich recalls: “Ear-
Figure : Th e bonfi re of reprimands: a drawing 
from the Metro workspaces (© Denys Gorbach) 
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lier, you could steal as much as you want, and 
still you knew that there would be enough re-
sources for production needs. Now, there is not 
much to steal in the fi rst place.”
My informants are quick to indicate the 
reason for all these transformations: austerity 
policies, both on the macro level and on the en-
terprise level. Th e lack of resources, caused by 
macro processes, undermines the hegemonic 
confi guration on the very lowest level of the 
post-Soviet workplace, introducing disciplinary 
and bureaucratic pressure on workers. Th e fac-
tory regime is shift ing toward the despotic ideal 
type, or, rather, the management unilaterally re-
negotiates the informal hegemonic setup in its 
own favor.
Th e enterprise
Decreasing interest in preserving the “labor col-
lective” in the Metro, even despite understaffi  ng, 
is the fi rst sign of trends that have developed 
more fully at private companies. At Kyivenergo, 
the era of labor hoarding ended in the 2000s. 
It once employed 16,000 people, but today only 
10,000 are left , and the workforce will be further 
cut to 8,000. Th e union has no say in this gradual 
dismantling of classic quasi-feudal post-Soviet 
enterprise. In Marxist terms, the “labor collec-
tives” insured against fi rings and layoff s were a 
major obstacle to creating marketable abstract 
labor, and the enterprises thus were stuck in a 
noncapitalist form (T icktin 2002: 20). Now, we 
are witnessing capitalist “normalization,” and it 
is only natural that profi t-oriented private com-
panies introduce it sooner than publicly owned 
and subsidized ones.
Austerity and “marketization” undermines 
the union’s hegemonic role of a provider of non-
wage benefi ts. Th e union’s other role—that of 
a mediator between workers and administra-
tion—is also challenged by the parallel structures 
introduced by the management. Kyivenergo’s 
administration advertises a telephone hotline 
for workers having a confl ict or an unresolved 
issue; the union has nothing to do with it. Th ese 
processes, which Sarah Ashwin and Simon 
Clarke (2003: 274) call “Japanization” of indus-
trial relations, are yet more signs of a crisis of 
the post-Soviet “transitionary” hegemonic con-
juncture. Th e owners believe they can ensure 
social peace at their companies without the help 
of the unions.
Conclusion: Where next?
Looking back at the experience of Maidan mo-
bilization and considering the regime evolution 
in neighboring Russia, Hungary, and Poland, 
one could tentatively contemplate two possible 
scenarios for the nearest decade: gradual con-
solidation of an austerity-minded populist re-
gime or continuing slow socioeconomic break-
down. In the early 1990s, Ukrainian enterprises 
switched to the post-Soviet system of relations 
of and in production that relied on workers’ 
“negative control” over production process and 
the foreman as a key fi gure on the lowest level; 
on the “plan-fulfi llment pact” based on the col-
lusion of interests between workers and factory 
management and mediated by the union at the 
enterprise level; and on attempts by the state to 
use union bureaucracy in ensuring social peace 
and legitimizing its own rule at the top level. 
While, elsewhere in CEE, labor force was mas-
sively shed and “ineffi  cient” companies went 
bankrupt, Ukrainian enterprises and the state 
had the opposite policy, trying to preserve “la-
bor collectives” where possible.
Th is hegemonic conjuncture was conceived 
by a historical bloc between industrial bureau-
cracy (“red directors”) and labor aristocracy; its 
ideological imperative was survival in the face 
of cataclysmic transition, in the name of which 
the reign of the law of value was restrained. Pri-
vatization and the emergence of oligarchy spelled 
the political death of “red directors.” Yet, the 
new owners were willing to continue these poli-
cies in the new conjuncture, marked by populist 
“oligarchic democracy.” Just as their predeces-
sors, they also used “labor collective” patronage. 
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Enjoying windfall profi ts on the global markets 
during the commodities boom of the 2000s, 
they could aff ord corporate and nationwide wel-
fare programs. Profi tability was extraordinarily 
high due to the parasitic character of the own-
ing class: having purchased their assets cheaply 
from the state through insider deals, they did 
not feel obliged to reinvest into amortization 
and modernization of capital.
Feasting on the resources left  by the previ-
ous socioeconomic formation and on the profi ts 
generated by the global commodity boom, the 
ruling class did not mind sharing them with the 
workers, thereby reinforcing and maintaining 
the post-Soviet hegemonic expectations from 
the factory, union, and state. Th is social con-
tract implied several unspoken mutual commit-
ments, under which workers were to maintain 
social peace and loyalty to the enterprise, while 
the owner of the enterprise guaranteed pre-
serving jobs, a lax attitude, and certain levels of 
monetary and nonmonetary income. Yet, this 
hegemonic confi guration cannot stay forever. 
Depletion of Soviet resources was aggravated by 
the crisis of 2008 and the long recession, which 
began in 2012 and culminated in the drastic 
fall of living standards in 2014. Th e post-Soviet 
corporatist hegemony is slowly eroding on all 
levels: the micro level of relations between the 
foreman and workers, the union-administra-
tion nexus, and the macro stage featuring the 
state and union bureaucracy.
Th e global scale is important in two con-
texts here. First, it was the arena of the spatial 
fi x performed by the new owners of industrial 
enterprises. Unlike the more high-tech post-
Soviet companies, factories producing inter-
mediate products for industry were able to fi nd 
demand on the global markets and benefi t from 
the 1997–2012 upward commodity cycle while 
it lasted. Second, the Ukrainian economy’s abil-
ity to isolate itself from the penetration of in-
ternational capital and to be equally active on 
both the EU and Russian markets has also been 
an important resource underpinning the post-
Soviet hegemonic pact.
Aft er Maidan, the dismal state of the in-
vestment-hungry economy and physical infra-
structure actually gave hope for a colonization 
of Ukraine by EU capital, which could benefi t 
from big demand for investments and high 
profi t rate, repeating the Czech, Slovak, and 
Polish scenarios. But civil confl ict and war with 
Russia, retrenchment of national oligarchic 
elites, and lack of political will in the EU and the 
IMF to fi nance a “Marshall Plan for Ukraine” 
made these hopes unrealistic. On the other 
hand, repeating the Russian path of controlled 
dismantling of the transitionary conjuncture 
and neoliberalization under the auspices of a 
strong state apparatus is impossible because 
of the endemic state weakness, among other 
reasons. Instead of benefi ting from the global 
crisis of profi tability, the Ukrainian economy is 
now set to fi nd itself on the losing side, whereby 
destruction of obsolete and ineffi  cient indus-
trial assets should help raise the profi t rate for 
(foreign) survivors.
It is unlikely we will see any rapid measures 
to raise labor intensity and renegotiate the 
terms of social contract in the favor of the class 
of owners anytime soon. Rather, the traditional 
post-Soviet hegemonic confi guration will keep 
transforming itself slowly, as it has been doing 
for the past decade, in the direction of a more 
despotic factory regime on lower levels and a 
populist regime committed to fi scal discipline 
on the top level. What does this conjunctural 
crisis imply for working-class protest culture 
and militant unionism? Macroeconomic con-
text of protracted economic slump never bodes 
well for grassroots militancy. Shrinking employ-
ment options force workers to agree on worsen-
ing labor conditions rather than protest, as the 
example of Metro workers proves so well. Th is 
combination channels implicit class confl icts 
along unorthodox routes: continuing traditions 
of the “perverted class struggle,” inventing new 
atomized survival strategies, and/or joining 
populist movements that tend to work with 
wider constructed identities, be they ethnic, 
linguistic or “civilizational.” Th e latest develop-
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ments at the top level of union bureaucracy 
seem to indicate precisely this possibility.
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